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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TANNER LEE GOFORTH,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 45441
Ada County Case No.
CR-2012-13318

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Goforth failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation?

Goforth Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Goforth and his stepfather went to a motel with the intent to rob Goforth’s marijuana
supplier of the supplier’s drugs and cash. (PSI, pp.46-47.) During the attempted robbery,
Goforth’s stepfather shot and critically injured one of the occupants of the motel room. (PSI,
pp.46-47.)
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A grand jury initially indicted Goforth for burglary and aiding and abetting aggravated
battery (R., pp.42-43), but the state later filed an amended information charging Goforth with
burglary, attempted robbery, and a deadly weapon enhancement (R., pp.67-68). Pursuant to a
plea agreement, Goforth pled guilty to attempted robbery, and the state dismissed the remaining
charge and the enhancement. (R., pp.69-76.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of 15
years, with five years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.77-79.) After a period of retained
jurisdiction, the district court suspended the balance of Goforth’s sentence and placed him on
probation for a period of 15 years, commencing on July 29, 2013. (R., pp.85-90.)
Four years later, in August 2017, the state filed a motion for probation violation alleging
that Goforth had violated his probation by: (1) committing a misdemeanor commercial driver’s
license violation in November 2015; (2) failing to attend an AA/NA meeting in June 2017; (3)
failing to maintain full-time employment; (4) admitting to having consumed alcohol “multiple
times” during the month of July 2017; (5) using and/or possessing carsiprodol without a
prescription in August 2017; (6) testing positive for marijuana on seven separate occasions
between March 29, 2016, and June 6, 2017; (7) admitting to having smoked marijuana “multiple
times” during the month of July 2016; (8) admitting to having used marijuana on October 6,
2016; (9) admitting to having “us[ed] marijuana daily throughout the month of October 2016”;
(10) testing positive for opiates in July 2017; (11) using hydromorphone without a prescription in
July 2017; (12) using and/or possessing hydrocodone without a prescription in July 2017; (13)
failing to report for urinalysis testing on three separate occasions between January 3 and January
20, 2017; (14) failing to pay fines, fees, and court costs; and (15) failing to pay restitution. (R.,
pp.106-15.) Goforth admitted six of the 15 allegations and, in September 2017, the district court
revoked his probation and ordered his underlying sentence executed. (R., pp.118, 122-24.)
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Goforth filed a motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp.12526, 137-38.) Goforth filed a timely notice of appeal from the order revoking probation. (R.,
pp.130-32.)
Goforth asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation in
light of his acceptance of responsibility, “lack of previous probation violations,” amenability to
treatment, previous success on his rider, community support, and his claim that “the district court
appeared to be operating under the mistaken belief the Mr. Goforth had repeated probation
violations, failed to complete any substance abuse treatment and was generally, preforming
terribly.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-12.) Goforth has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.” I.C. § 19-2601(4). The
decision to revoke probation lies within the sound discretion of the district court. State v. Roy,
113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d, 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 842
P.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1992). When deciding whether to revoke probation, the district court must
consider “whether the probation [was] achieving the goal of rehabilitation and [was] consistent
with the protection of society.” Drennen, 122 Idaho at 1022, 842 P.2d at 701.
Goforth has demonstrated through his conduct that he is no longer an appropriate
candidate for community supervision and that probation was not achieving the goal of
rehabilitation. As noted by the district court at the disposition hearing, the offense for which
Goforth was on probation was “really serious” and was connected, at least “in part,” to Goforth’s
drug use “because [Goforth] decided to rob a dealer. And, in the meantime, a bystander got
shot.” (9/18/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.13-17.) Despite the seriousness of the crime and its relationship to
his marijuana use, and despite having successfully completed a period of retained jurisdiction
and programming designed to address and treat his substance abuse issues (see PSI, pp.243-50),
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Goforth resumed using marijuana and other controlled substances no later than March 2016—
less than three years into his 15-year probationary period (R., pp.106-15, 118). Goforth’s
probation officer attempted to address Goforth’s drug use and failure to comply with required
treatment by imposing discretionary jail time in November 2016 and home confinement in
February 2017 (Sealed Exhibits, pp.6-7), but Goforth continued to use marijuana and other
controlled substances for which he did not have a prescription into the summer of 2017 (R.,
pp.106-15, 118). He also failed to maintain or even seek employment because, by his own
admission, he had “a hard time getting off [his] lazy butt and going to work.” (R., p.110.)
Goforth claims that, in revoking his probation, the district court failed to adequately
consider “several mitigating factors.” (Revised Appellant’s Brief, p.5.) He notes he accepted
responsibility for his violations, both during the disposition hearing and while being supervised
(Revised Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-6); but he fails to mention that, even after the February 3, 2017
meeting with his probation officer at which he admitted using marijuana and purported a
willingness to accept any consequences for his actions, he continued to use marijuana and other
controlled substances for several months, until a report of violation was filed. (R., pp.106-15,
118; Sealed Exhibits, pp.6-7.)
Goforth next claims “it is noteworthy that since being placed on probation in July of
2013, [he] performed without major incident for over four years.” (Revised Appellant’s Brief,
p.6.) The state agrees that such an accomplishment would, indeed, be noteworthy, but that is not
what happened in this case. It is true the record discloses no prior reports of violation or
adjudicated probation violations before the violations at issue in this case. Contrary to his
assertions, however, Goforth did not go “several years without a major incident, between 2013
and 2017.” (Revised Appellant’s Brief, p.6 (emphasis in original).) Rather, the record shows
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Goforth began violating his probation no later than November 2015, when he committed a new
misdemeanor offense, and he continued to violate his probation in multiple ways and on multiple
occasions until he was arrested on an agent’s warrant in August 2017. (R., pp.106-15, 118.)
Goforth also cites his “stellar performance on his rider,” his rehabilitative efforts, his
future employability and his community support as factors he claims “demonstrate that [he] was
recovering, and in the process of rehabilitation.” (Revised Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-9.) While
Goforth’s performance on his rider and limited efforts and rehabilitation are laudable, they do
not show the court abused its discretion in deciding to revoke Goforth’s probation. Goforth
continued to use illegal substances despite his completion of the rider programming (R., pp.10615, 118; Sealed Exhibits, pp.6-7); he completed treatment through Easter Seals only after
missing multiple “urine drug tests” and being “informed that he was close to being kicked out of
treatment if he did not re-engage in supervision” (R., p.113; Sealed Exhibits, pp.6-7); and he was
apparently unmotivated to “get[] off [his] lazy butt” to even look for work until he was facing the
probation violations at issue in this case (R., p.110). Under these circumstances, that the district
court did not view Goforth’s eleventh-hour efforts to demonstrate he was amenable to
rehabilitation in the community as actually meriting continued probation is neither unreasonable
nor surprising.
Finally, Goforth argues that the district court abused its discretion because, according to
Goforth, the court’s decision to revoke probation was “based upon incorrect information.”
(Revised Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-11.) Specifically, Goforth contends that the court’s comments
at the disposition hearing indicate that it believed “Goforth had been granted probation more than
once,” that he had not worked at all while on probation, that there was “no evidence” he had
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been trying at all on probation, and that he had only made one restitution payment.” (Revised
Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-11.) Goforth’s argument fails.
While the district court stated that it had given Goforth “a significant chance by giving
[him] a rider and then placing [him] on probation again” (9/18/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.18-20), there is no
indication in the record that the court actually believed Goforth had been on probation more than
once. The court’s focus was clearly on the seriousness of the underlying crime and on Goforth’s
failure to take advantage of the two rehabilitative opportunities he had been provided in this case
(i.e., a rider and probation). Likewise, although the district court lamented to Goforth that he had
“admitted to not working at all” (9/18/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.20-21), there is no indication the court was
unaware of information in the record that showed Goforth had sporadically worked while on
probation. The court’s comment was specifically directed at Goforth’s admission (that he had
been out of work for several months and had difficulty “getting off [his] lazy butt and going to
work”), not at other evidence in the record. Additionally, the district court’s statement that it
saw “no evidence” that Goforth had been trying at all while on probation (9/18/17 Tr., p.10,
Ls.1-3) does not show that the district court ignored any evidence in the record before it. The
court was clearly aware of Goforth’s limited and belated rehabilitative efforts, both because they
were contained in the written materials provided to it and because Goforth’s counsel referred to
them during his argument at the disposition hearing. (See 9/18/17 Tr., p.5, L.20 – p.7, L.18.)
That the court found those efforts were not good enough—i.e., that Goforth was not trying at
all—does not show an abuse of discretion. Finally, the court’s statement that Goforth had only
made one restitution payment (9/18/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.8-10), while technically incorrect, clearly
did not affect the disposition. As noted by the court, Goforth was ordered to pay over $91,000 in
restitution.

(R., pp.91-92.)

That Goforth paid a total of $840.40 toward that restitution
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obligation and court costs over a period of five years (see R., p.116) (as opposed to one payment
of $150) in no way undermines the court’s ultimate conclusion relative to its restitution comment
that “whatever [Goforth’s] work was doing, it wasn’t taking responsibility for the harm that [he]
caused.” (9/18/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.8-12.)
Probation was clearly not serving the purpose of rehabilitation in this case, as evidenced
by Goforth's ongoing substance abuse and failures to abide by the conditions of his probation.
Given any reasonable view of the facts, Goforth has failed to establish that the district court
abused its discretion by revoking his probation.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s orders revoking
probation and denying Goforth’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

DATED this 16th day of March, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of March, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
LARA E. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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